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1980] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW
Carrier's release from future liability effected by employee's third
party recovery held not a benefit for consideration in apportion-
ing litigation expenses
Section 29(1) of the Worker's Compensation Law (WCL) pro-
vides that an employee injured in the course of his employment
through the fault of one other than his employer or fellow em-
ployee may pursue a third party action for damages without com-
promising his statutory entitlement to compensation. 215 In order to
ensure the continued viability of the compensation system, how-
ever, the compensation carrier is afforded a lien upon the proceeds
of any recovery to the extent of the benefits previously paid to the
employee.8 8 Where the carrier seeks to satisfy such lien out of the
proceeds of a judgment or settlement procured through the efforts
tisement. See id. It is submitted that the vagueness of these rules detract from their value
as purported standards to be followed by the advertising attorney.
It should be noted that proposed rule 9.3 permits solicitation on a limited basis. It
provides, in part, that "a lawyer may initiate contact with a prospective client ... [b]y a
letter concerning a specific event or transaction if the letter is followed up only upon posi-
tive response by the addressee. . . ." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 9.3
(1980). This provision apparently would sanction the type of letter sent by the defendants
in Koffier.
I'l N.Y. WORK. Cohip. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Originally, an em-
ployee had to choose between bringing his action against the third party or receiving pay-
ments from the compensation carrier. Ch. 816, § 29, [1913] N.Y. Laws 2293. The employee's
election to receive compensation benefits constituted an automatic assignment of the tort
cause of action of the carrier. Id.; Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 340, 39 N.E.2d
903, 904 (1942). The practical consequence of this election was that injured employees,
financially unable to await the uncertain outcome of litigation, would "choose" to receive
the compensation payments. See Gegan, The Compensation Carrier's Right to Restitution
for Medical Expenses Through a Lien on the Employee's Tort Recovery, 52 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 395, 401 (1978); 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 282, 282 (1938). The abolition of this forced elec-
tion allowed the employee to collect his benefits without surrendering his right to bring a
third party suit. Ch. 684, § 29, [1937] N.Y. Laws 1556 (McKinney). See also Gegan, supra,
at 401.
286 See N.Y. WORK. Corap. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). The compensa-
tion carrier's lien was an outgrowth of the 1937 amendment to section 29(1) of the WCL
designed to prevent a double recovery by the employee and to provide the carrier with an
opportunity to recoup payments already made to the employee. See Granger v. Urda, 44
N.Y.2d 91, 97, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1978); Becker v. Huss Co., 43
N.Y.2d 527, 538, 373 N.E.2d 1205, 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982-83 (1978); Curtin v. City of
New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 342-43, 39 N.E.2d 903, 905 (1942); Gegan, supra note 284, at 401-
02. The lien attaches to any recovery, whether by judgment or settlement, arising from the
injury which originally generated the compensation payments. See Ryan v. General Elec.
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 6, 9, 256 N.E.2d 188, 189, 307 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (1970); Petterson v. Day-
strom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 32, 39, 215 N.E.2d 329, 332, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1966).
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of the injured employee, a 1975 amendment to the statute requires
that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the action, includ-
ing attorneys' fees, be "equitably apportioned" between the em-
ployee and the carrier.8 7 Despite the simplicity of the statutory
mandate, however, no clear guidelines have been established to
govern either the manner of the apportionment or, more impor-
tantly, the relative benefits upon which the apportionment is to be
based.2"" Recently, however, in Castleberry v. Hudson Valley
287 Ch. 190, § 29(1), [1975] N.Y. Laws 293-94 (McKinney) added to the statute the
following:
Should the employee or his dependents secure a recovery from such other,
whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, such employee or dependents may
apply on notice to such lienor to the court in which the third party action was
instituted . . . for an order apportioning the reasonable and necessary expendi-
tures, including attorneys' fees, incurred in effecting such recovery. Such expendi-
tures shall be equitably apportioned by the court between the employee or his
dependents and the lienor.
N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 227(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)(disability benefits), was simi-
larly amended to provide for apportionment of legal expenses. Ch. 190, § 227, [1975] N.Y.
Laws 294 (McKinney).
The 1975 Amendment was designed to eliminate two basic inequities which existed in
the WCL. See Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission Relating to the Apportion-
ment of Attorneys' Fees in Third-Party Actions Under the Workmen's Compensation Law
§§ 29 and 227, [1975] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1551,
1552 (McKinney) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Memorandum]. First, compensation liens were
being fully satisfied withodt the carrier sharing the costs of the recovery. Id. at 1552. Sec-
ond, where the third party recoveries were modest in amount, employees were left with
little, if any of the proceeds after the attorney's lien and the compensation lien were paid.
Id.
The amendment of section 29(1) of the WCL brought New York in line with an increas-
ing number of states favoring apportionment of legal expenses incurred in a third party suit
between the employee and the employer's compensation carrier. Id. at 1553; 2A A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 74.32 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Atleson, Workmen's Compen-
sation: Third Party Actions and the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees, 19 BUFFALO L. REy.
515, 539 (1970).
28 By wording the statute to provide for "equitable" apportionment, the legislature
avoided the adoption of a fixed formula to be applied in each case, opting instead for a more
flexible scheme to be utilized by the trial court which is entertaining the third-party action.
See 1975 Memorandum, supra, note 287, at 1553. Indeed, in Becker v. Huss Co., 43 N.Y.2d
527, 373 N.E.2d 1205, 402 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1978), it was noted that since the statute was
designed to allow trial court discretion, it would be the rare case where the trial court's
determination would be subject to review on appeal. Id. at 544, 373 N.E.2d at 1211, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 986. The Becker Court enumerated several factors to be weighed in determining
the carrier's equitable share of the expenses, including the reasonableness of the lawyer's
retainer, whether the retainer was influenced by the knowledge that the carrier would be
shouldering part of the costs, the overall difficulty or ease of the case, and any other equita-
ble circumstances. Id. at 543, 373 N.E.2d at 1211, 402 N.Y.S. 2d at 986.
Two formulas for computing the carrier's share of the attorneys' fees have evolved in
the lower courts. Under one approach, the carrier's proportionate share is equal to the
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Asphalt Corp.,289 the Appellate Division, Second Department, had
occasion to construe the apportionment provision, holding that the
carrier's release from future liability effected by the recovery in the
third party action is not a benefit upon which the apportionment
of attorneys' fees may be based.290
Plaintiff Castleberry had been injured in the course of his em-
ployment and was receiving weekly payments from his employer's
compensation carrier.29 ' Subsequently, he brought a third-party
action against the defendant for his injuries, which was ultimately
settled for $75,000 without the carrier's consent or a judicial com-
promise order.292 Pursuant to the apportionment of costs provision
of section 29(1), the plaintiff thereupon petitioned the Supreme
Court, Orange County to extinguish the full amount of the carrier's
lien.29 3 The plaintiff argued that since all of the recovery inured to
the carrier's benefit by discharging its liability for future pay-
ments, the carriers should absorb the entire $25,000 in legal fees
incurred in settling the third party suit.2 94 The lower court, agree-
ing with the plaintiff's contention, granted the motion, but limited
the carrier's equitable share of the expenses to the amount of its
lien.29 5
amount of the carrier's lien multiplied by the ratio of the attorney's fee to the total recov-
ery. Rice v. Bankers Trust Co., 83 Misc. 2d 797, 798, 374 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1975). The alternative computation method is to multiply the amount of the total
legal fees by the ratio of the lien to the total recovery. Wargo v. Longo, 85 Misc. 2d 898, 900,
380 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976). Under either method, however, the
result is the same. See Castleberry v. Hudson Valley Asphalt Corp., 70 App. Div. 2d 228, 245
n.4, 420 N.Y.S.2d 911, 923 n.4 (2d Dep't 1979) (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
219 70 App. Div. 2d 228, 420 N.Y.S.2d 911 (2d Dep't 1979).
290 Id. at 238, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
291 Id. at 239, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
If Castleberry's condition remained the same, the compensation payments would con-
tinue indefinitely. Id. at 237-38, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Based on his life expenctancy, the
recovery from the carrier would, therefore, have totalled over $100,000. Id.
292 Id. at 230, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 912; see id. at 239, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Shapiro, J.,
dissenting). See note 306 infra.
293 Id. at 230, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
294 Id.
299 97 Misc. 2d 578, 580-81, 412 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1978). Since
the carrier's lien will apply "to [the] extent such recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of
such ... carrier," N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980), the court
viewed the release of "estimated future compensation" as constituting a benefit to the car-
rier. 97 Misc. 2d at 580, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 91. The court, however, did not explain why it
limited the amount of the carrier's contribution to the amount of its lien without requiring
the carrier to fully reimburse the attorney. While no case has been found in which the car-
rier was required to make an additional disbursement, the language of the statute appar-
ently does not rule out such a result.
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A divided appellate division reversed, stating that it was error
to compromise completely the statutory lien of the carrier "under
the guise of an apportionment of attorneys' fees."296 Writing for
the majority, Justice Margett stated that by sanctioning such an
apportionment, the lower court had circumvented not only the
objectives of the compensation scheme in general by ignoring the
"inviolable" nature of the carrier's lien,297 but had contravened the
legislative intent underlying the 1975 amendment as well. 298 Con-
ceding that the amendment was intended to assess proportionately
the costs of procuring a judgment among the parties benefitting
therefrom,299 the Castleberry majority found no evidence that the
legislature contemplated the impostion of all costs on the lienor,
where, in the third party action, the plaintiff recovered "less than
'the sum of the lien plus the estimated liability of the carrier extin-
guished by the recovery.' -"3o Indeed, the court noted, nullifying a
carrier's lien in such circumstances would afford the injured em-
ployee the "double satisfaction" of both statutory and common law
recovery, a result which the existence of the lien was intended to
obviate.30' Hence, the court concluded, a proper application of the
equitable apportionment provision required that the injured em-
ployee bear "that proportion of the attorneys' fees which his
'share' of the recovery (i.e., the total settlement less the compensa-
299 70 App. Div. 2d at 230, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 913. Justices Cohalan and Martuscello
joined Justice Margett in the majority. Concurring only in the reversal, Justice Shapiro dis-
sented in a separate opinion.
297 Id. at 230-31, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 913; see Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 96, 375
N.E.2d 380, 381, 404 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (1978). Noting the broad reach of the statute, the
Court of Appeals in Granger found that the lien attaches "whenever a recovery is obtained
in tort for the same injury that was a predicate for the payment of compensation benefits."
Id. at 97, 375 N.E.2d at 381, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 321 (quoting Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17
N.Y.2d 32, 39, 215 N.E.2d 329, 332, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1966)).
299 70 App. Div. 2d at 230, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 913. See note 300 infra. See generally id. at
234, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 915 (citing 1975 Memorandum, supra note 287, at 1552-53). Justice
Margett observed that the 1975 amendment sought to charge the carrier with a proportion-
ate share of the litigation expenses and prevent recoveries from being fully exhausted by the
lien and the attorneys' fees. Id. at 235, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
299 Id. at 235, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 916; see 1975 Memorandum, supra note 287 at 1552.
300 70 App. Div. 2d at 235, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The Castleberry court asserted that it
was "nothing short of incredible" to apply the 1975 amendment as a legislative "emascula-
tion" of the carrier's lien. Id. at 232, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 914. The court reasoned that the
carrier's future liability was too indefinite to be viewed as an amount benefitting the carrier,
since a compensation award is subject to modification based on changed conditions. Id. at
235 & n.2, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 916 & n.2.
30 Id. at 236, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 917. See note 286, supra.
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tion lien, if any) bears to the total recovery. 30 2
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Shapiro endorsed the conclusion
reached by special term that the carrier's release from future liabil-
ity is a benefit against which a proportionate share of the expenses
should be assessed.30 3 Maintaining that the recovery in the third-
party suit takes the place of compensation benefits, the dissent
contended that legal expenses should not be assessed against the
plaintiff where the amount of the recovery does not exceed the car-
rier's lien plus its future liability, since to do so would "dilute" the
recovery guaranteed by the WCL.304 Justice Shapiro concurred in
the reversal, however, because the lower court's apportionment of
the attorneys' fees was not based on the present value of the car-
rier's discharge from future obligations.0
It is submitted that the Castleberry court's refusal to extin-
guish the carrier's lien to the extent of his liability for deficiency
payments overemphasizes the importance of the lien in maintain-
ing the viability of the compensation scheme. Assuming compli-
ance with the statutory notice requirements,306 when the third
302 70 App. Div. 2d at 238, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 918. As the attorneys' fees in the settlement
were one-third of the recovery, the court allocated $6801 of the fees to the carrier, which
was equivalent to one third of the amount of its lien. Id. at 238-39, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
103 Id. at 239, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 918-19 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
-0- Id. at 247, 420 N.Y.S.2d t 923 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that if
the employee chose only to receive his compensation benefits, he would not have been re-
quired to pay any attorneys' fees in order to receive them. Id. (Shapiro, J., dissenting). Since
a third party recovery effectively replaces compensation payments, Justice Shapiro reasoned
that if the recovery was less than the amount already paid by the carrier plus its future
liability, allowing further reduction of the proceeds through payments of litigation expenses
would undercut the employee's statutorily guaranteed compensation. Id. at 247, 420
N.Y.S.2d at 923-24 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissent pointed out, most other
states faced with the same issue have held that the release from future liability is a benefit
which must be considered in apportioning attorneys' fees. Id. at 248-50, 420 N.Y.S.2d at
924-25 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
305 Id. at 250-51, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (Shapiro, J., dissenting). Justice Shapiro pointed
out that by failing to reduce the carrier's future obligation to present value, Special Term
overstated the amount of the benefit inuring to the insurer, and as a result, incorrectly
apportioned the costs of attorneys' fees. Id. (Shapiro, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
concept of present value, see K. BOUDREAUX & H. LONG, THE BASIC THEORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE, 15-18 (1977); H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, § 95 (1961).
300 Id. at 237, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 917. Section 29(5) of the WCL provides that where the
proposed settlement of the third-party action is less than the amount of the carrier's lien,
the employee must either obtain written approval from the carrier or a judicial compromise
order. N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 29 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Failure to comply with
these requirements automatically discharge any remaining future liability of the carrier. See
Kusiak v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 49 App. Div. 2d 122, 124, 373 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716
(4th Dep't 1975); O'Brien v. Lodi, 246 N.Y. 46, 51, 157 N.E. 925, 926 (1927). The purpose of
19801
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party recovery is less than the carrier's future liability plus its lien,
the apportionment provision does not affect the amount of the
benefits ultimately to be paid to the employee. 07 In such a case,
the carrier remains liable for deficiency payments to the extent
that its future obligation under the compensation claim exceeds
the employee's net recovery from the third party action. 08 Hence,
where the third party recovery does not discharge the carrier's fu-
ture obligation, an apportionment of costs such as that granted by
special term affects the timing but not the amount of the carrier's
aggregate liability.309 Such a result cannot logically be viewed as
imperiling the integrity of the compensation scheme.3 10
By incorrectly assessing the implications of imposing most, if
not all, of the litigation expenses upon the carrier in a Castleberry
situation, it is suggested that the majority reached a result incon-
sistent with the policy of encouraging employees to pursue their
claims against third party tortfeasors..31 Since the potential for an
requiring either carrier approval or judicial consent is to prevent the "imprudent settle-
ment" of third party claims which may adversely affect the carrier's rights. See Meachem v.
New York Cent. R.R., 8 N.Y.2d 293, 297, 169 N.E.2d 913, 916, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (1960);
Kusiak v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 49 App. Div. 2d 122, 124, 373 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716
(4th Dep't 1975); Clark v. Oakes & Burger Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 490, 491-92, 229 N.Y.S.2d
513, 515 (3d Dep't 1962).
307 Id. at 238, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18. Where a recovery in a third party action is less
than the future obligation of the compensation carrier, the carrier must pay the employee
any deficiency. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). The carrier in
effect shoulders the total costs of attorneys' fees in such a case, since what he does not pay
in the apportionment of attorneys' fees will ultimately be made up in deficiency payments.
See id.; Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 341-44, 39 N.E.2d 903, 904-06 (1942);
Kussack v. Ring Constr. Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 634, 635, 153 N.Y.S.2d 646, 647 (3d Dep't
1956), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 1011, 177 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1958).
308 N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See Castleberry, 70
App. Div. 2d at 236-37, 420 JN.Y.S.2d at 917 (citing Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y.
338, 39 N.E.2d 903 (1942)).
309 See note 307 supra.
330 The Castleberry court's conclusion, however, appears to be correct where the em-
ployee settles without complying with the statutory notice requirements. In such a case, the
aggregate liability of the carrier would not be the same under either apportionment, since
the employee is not entitled to recoup his legal expenses in the form of increased deficiency
payments.
311 Viewed in conjunction with the statutory lien afforded the carrier, see N.Y. WORK.
COmP. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980), the purpose of encouraging an injured
employee to pursue his common-law remedy against a third party tortfeasor is to keep the
costs of coverage within practical limits, thus insuring the continued viability of the com-
pensation system. See Granger v. Urda, 44 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 375 N.E.2d 380, 382, 404 N.Y.S.2d
319, 321 (1978); Becker v. Huss Co., 43 N.Y.2d 527, 537-38, 373 N.E.2d 1205, 1207, 402
N.Y.S.2d 980, 982-83 (1978); Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 338, 342-43, 39 N.E.2d
903, 905 (1942). An additional, more fundamental consideration, is to assure the protection
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earlier realization of his benefits operates as an inducement to the
employee to seek such a recovery,112 an incentive enhanced by the
recent amendment to Section 29(1),1 s it appears incongruous to
reject an apportionment which depletes the employee's share of
the judgment but then allows him to recoup the costs assessed
against him in the form of periodic future payments from the car-
rier.31 4 It is submitted, therefore, that where the third party recov-
ery does not exceed the sum of the lien and the carrier's future
obligation, the objectives of the WCL could best be met if future
courts, in equitably apportioning the litigation expenses, strive to
maximize the residuum of the judgment.
Paul R. Williams
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW
Court of Appeals prohibits insurer's indemnification of municipal
employee for punitive damages arising out of federal civil rights
action as contrary to public policy
Under a policy of liability insurance, an insurer is obligated to
indemnify its insured for an award of compensatory damages ren-
dered in a suit within the purview of the policy's provisions.sle
of the worker and his family through preservation of any rights he may have which are not
inconsistent with the compensation system. See McCoid, The Third Person in the Compen-
sation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV.
389, 401 (1959).
312 In the 1975 Memorandum, note 287 supra, the Law Revision Commission implicitly
recognized that a reduction, or elimination of the proceeds inuring to the employee from the
third party action would detract from the policy of encouraging employees to pursue their
common-law remedies. See id. at 1552.
313 See id. at 1552-53.
314 See generally N.Y, WORK. Comp'. LAW § 29(4)(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); note 287
supra.
310 See 1 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 1:2, 1:4, 1:5 (2d ed. 1959). Insurance
is a voluntary contract between an insurer and its insured. The rights and obligations of the
parties, absent contravention of public policy or statute, are governed by the policy's terms.
Id.; V. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 542 (4th ed. 1971). See Kronfeld v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 81
Misc. 2d 557, 562, 365 N.Y.S.2d 416, 422 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), af'd, 53 App. Div. 2d
190, 385 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1976). The duty of an insurer to defend a lawsuit brought
against its insured arises when the pleadings disclose facts which describe a risk covered
under the policy. Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 83 Misc. 2d 394, 399, 371 N.Y.S.2d
927, 934 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
Liability insurance is designed to reduce an insured's risk of loss and protect him
against the deleterious effects of large damage awards. See R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCI-
